Constitutional Rules, Legislative Norms and Agricultural Policy Outcomes in the EU-System

Project: Political Institutions and Agricultural Protection: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Evidence from TSCS Data
Contact: Christian Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 09/2010
End: 09/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: In this paper we derive a theoretical models of agricultural policy decision-making under different governmental systems defined by constitutional rules and informal legislative norms. In particular, based on our models a comparison of policy outcomes under different governmental systems observed for EU-6,-EU-15 and EU-27 with the counterfactual policy outcomes that would be observed under a parliamentary and a presidential regime, respectively, will be undertaken. Moreover, we analyze to what extend constitutional choices are driven by anticipated policy outcomes under various legislative regimes. Theoretical prediction will be tested empirically, where not only comparative static results derived from our theory will be tested based on agricultural protection levels observed for different EU-systems, but also different model dynamics , i.e .speed of adaption of agricultural protection levels, predicted for different regimes by our theory.
Region: EU-member states and other developed and developing countries
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning and Eva Krampe: How the European Union Works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from EU Agricultural Policy.
    Paper presented at the Political Economy of International Organizations (PEIO), Zurich, Switzerland Extern
Keywords: comparative political economy, agricultural protection, constitutional rules, time-series cross-national data
Approach: Using a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 60 democracies since 1961 we will assess the role of constitutional rules empirically.
Data acquisition: World Development Indicators, FAO, Database of Political Institutions