Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Project: Political Institutions and Agricultural Protection: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Evidence from TSCS Data
Contact: Christian H. C. A. Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 09/2008
End: 09/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: This work package studies the interplay of formal constitutional rules and informal political institutions in determining the political success of agriculture in avoiding taxation or attracting government transfers in developing and industrialized countries, respectively. The model is based on a probabilistic voting environment incorporating legislative bargaining. In particular, the impact of electorate systems and parliamentary versus presidential systems are analyzed as formal constitutional rules, while legislative norms and political influence of interest groups are analyzed as informal institutions.
Region: developing and developed countries
Publications:
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning: Determinants of Agricultural Protection from an International Perspective. The Role of Political Institutions.
    IFPRI Discussion Paper 00805, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2008 Extern
Keywords: comparative political economy, agricultural protection, constitutional rules, time-series cross-national data
Approach: Using a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 75 countries since 1961 we will assess the role of constitutional rules empirically.
Data acquisition: World Development Indicators, FAO, Database of Political Institutions