Electoral Systems and Agricultural Protection: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Parliamentary Democracies

Project: Political Institutions and Agricultural Protection: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Evidence from TSCS Data
Contact: Christian Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 09/2008
End: 09/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: Despite numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade liberalization, agriculture remains highly protected in many but not all industrialized countries. Thus, inspired by new comparative political economy studies of Persson and Tabellini and others, our main aim in this work package is to explain how agricultural protection levels are systematically tied to different modes of political representation in industrialized countries. In particular, the role of electoral rules and bargaining within legislature of industrialized parliamentary systems in determining the political success of agriculture in attracting government transfers based on a probabilistic voting environment. In particular, the interaction effect between formal constitutional rules and informal institutions, i.e. coalition discipline and the influence of interest groups, should be analyzed.
Region: developed countries
Publications:
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning: Determinants of Agricultural Protection from an International Perspective. The Role of Political Institutions.
    IFPRI Discussion Paper 00805, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2008 Download Extern
Keywords: comparative political economy, EU-system, Common agricultural policy, formal and informal political institutions
Approach: Using a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 23 parliamentary democracies since 1961 we will empirically investigate the impact of electoral rule on agricultural protection.
Data acquisition: World Development Indicators, FAO, Database of Political Institutions