Social Capital and Government Performance

Project: ADVANCED-EVAL
Contact: Nana Zarnekow
Start: 08/2007
End: 2011
Finance: EU-Projekt ADVANCED-EVAL
Content: The study investigates the impact of social capital on local government performance in respect to measures of the European rural development policy. Understanding local politics basically as the provision of public goods, government performance is measured as the technical efficiency of public good production. As social capital components club-memberships as well as the voter-turnout are recognized, representing the social and political participation. Moreover, components are deduced, influencing the allocation of structural funds whereas special attention is paid on the importance of local government performance as well as on spatial effects. By this the structural program duration is linked to the possibility of knowledge spillovers.
Region: Poland and Slovakia
Publications:
  • Nana Zarnekow and Christian H. C. A. Henning: Soziales Kapital als Bestimmungsfaktor regionalpolitischer Leistungsfähigkeit.
    Paper presented at the 20th Annual Conference of the ÖGA "Land- und Ernährungswirtschaft 2020" in Vienna, Austria
Keywords: Social Capital, Government Performance, Data Envelopment Analysis, Spatial Econometrics, Knowledge Spillovers
Approach: Area of research is 'Political Economy, Political Economy of CAP'; Analysis of macro-level data for investigation of determinants of local government performance, focusing social capital components and analysis of macro-level data for investigation of determinants of structural funding allocation; theoretically the data envelopment analysis is applied to estimate local government performance; using the Malmquist-Index the temporal change in efficiency is received; furthermore, spatial lag as well as spatial error models are applied.
Data acquisition: Census-Data

Ämter- und Policy-Motivation deutscher Parteien bei der Bildung von Koalitionsregierungen

Project:
Contact: Eric Linhart
Start: 01/2008
End: 03/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: Ziel des Projektes ist die empirische Überprüfung und Weiterentwicklung neuerer Konzepte der Koalitionstheorie, die sowohl das Streben nach Ämtern als auch die Policy-Motivation der Parteien berücksichtigen.
Region: Deutschland
Publications:
  • Eric Linhart and Marc Debus and Thomas Bräuninger: The 2009 Elections in Schleswig-Holstein: Polarised Electoral Campaign, Exceptional Election Results, and an Unspectacular Process of Government Formation.
    German Politics, 19(2): 237-253, 2010
  • Eric Linhart and Franz U. Pappi: Neuere Koalitionstheorien im Vergleich: Annahmen, Implikationen und Bewertung.
    Jahrestagung des AK Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie der DVPW, Mannheim
  • Susumu Shikano and Eric Linhart: Coalition - Formation as a Result of Policy and Office Motivations in the German Federal States: An Empirical Estimate of the Weighting Parameters of Both Motivations.
    Party Politics, 16(1): 111-130, 2010
  • Eric Linhart: Ämterschacher oder Politikmotivation? Koalitionsbildungen in Deutschland unter gleichzeitiger Berücksichtigung von zweierlei Motivationen der Parteien.
    In Susumu Shikano and Joachim Behnke and Thomas Bräuninger, Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie. 5, 181-222. VS Verlag, 2009.
  • Eric Linhart and Susumu Shikano: Ideological Signals of German Parties in a Multi - dimensional Space: An Estimation of Party Preferences Using the CMP Data.
    German Politics, 18(3): 301-322, 2009
  • Eric Linhart and Franz U. Pappi: Koalitionsbildungen zwischen Ämter- und Politikmotivation. Konstruktion einer interdependenten Nutzenfunktion.
    Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 50(1): 23-49, 2009
  • Eric Linhart: Von Österreich lernen?.
    Berliner Republik, 10(2): 26-33, 2008
  • Franz U. Pappi and Ralf Schmitt and Eric Linhart: Die Ministeriumsverteilung in den deutschen Landesregierungen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.
    Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 39(2): 323-342, 2008
  • Ralf Schmitt and Franz U. Pappi and Nicole Seher and Eric Linhart and Susumu Shikano: Politikfeld - spezifische Auswertung von Wahlprogrammen.
    Conference
  • Eric Linhart and Franz U. Pappi and Ralf Schmitt: Die proportionale Ministerienaufteilung in deutschen Koalitionsregierungen: Akzeptierte Norm oder das Ausnutzen strategischer Vorteile?.
    Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 49(1): 46-67, 2008
  • Eric Linhart and Susumu Shikano: Die Generierung von Parteipositionen aus vorverschlüsselten Wahlprogrammen für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949-2002).
    98, MZES Arbeitspapier 2007
  • Eric Linhart and Susumu Shikano: Die große Koalition in Österreich: Schwierigkeiten bei der Bildung, Stabilität und Alternativenlosigkeit.
    Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 36(2): 185-200, 2007
  • Eric Linhart: Die große Koalition in Österreich: Schwierigkeiten bei der Bildung, Stabilität und Alternativenlosigkeit.
    Conference
  • Susumu Shikano and Eric Linhart: Coalition - Formation as a Result of Policy and Office Motivations in the German Federal States: An Empirical Estimate of the Weighting Parameters of Both Motivations.
    Conference
  • Eric Linhart: Ampel, Linkskoalition und Jamaika als Alternativen zur großen Koalition.
    91, MZES Arbeitspapier 2006
Keywords: Koalitionstheorie, Ämtermotivation, Policy-Motivation, Parteien
Approach: Nach der Bestimmung der Parteipositionen im Policy-Raum und der Erstellung eines Datensatzes über die tatsächliche Aufteilung von Kabinettsposten in Deutschland auf Bundes- und Länderebene können Analysen durchgeführt werden, welche Koalitionen für welche Parteien erstrebenswert (Nutzen maximierend) sind oder nicht. Dies hängt wesentlich vom Grad der Ämter- bzw. Policy-Motivation der Parteien ab. Die real beobachtbaren Koalitionsbildungen lassen somit Rückschlüsse auf genau diese Grade zu.
Data acquisition: Literaturrecherche, Archivrecherche, Wahlprogramme, Daten des Comparative Manifesto Projekts

The Determining Factors of Local Governments Performance in Russia, Poland, Slovakia and Germany

Project: Local Government (Land-S-H)
Contact: Svetlana Petri
Start: 04/2010
End: 04/2013
Finance: Förderung des wissenschaftlichen und des künstlerischen Nachwuchses des Landes Schleswig-Holstein
Content: Public programs in infrastructure und social services throughout developing countries have been beset by problems of wastage and corruption. The Situation, where local elite can move the local governments to establish distorted policies to achieve additional rents, is called the "government capture". Furthermore, accountability of local government determines its’ performance delivering local public goods to their community. Both government capture and accountability are determined by the formal and informal institutional mechanisms of public goods delivery. In this context, the aim of this project is to analyze to which way and to what extend capture and accountability is influenced by formal and informal political institutions. To this end performance of local governments is understood as efficiency in the production of local public good. In detail, the impact of formal constitutional rules, e.g. federal versus central institutions, and local policy networks as informal political institutions on local government performance will be analyzed. Beyond a theoretical analysis the project includes a empirical comparative analysis between the selected countries: Russia, Poland, Slovakia and Germany.
Region: Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Germany
Publications:
Keywords: public goods, local government performance, decentralization, centralization, government capture
Approach:
Data acquisition: Survey, Database of Political Institutions

Constitutional Rules, Legislative Norms and Agricultural Policy Outcomes in the EU-System

Project: Political Institutions and Agricultural Protection: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Evidence from TSCS Data
Contact: Christian Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 09/2010
End: 09/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: In this paper we derive a theoretical models of agricultural policy decision-making under different governmental systems defined by constitutional rules and informal legislative norms. In particular, based on our models a comparison of policy outcomes under different governmental systems observed for EU-6,-EU-15 and EU-27 with the counterfactual policy outcomes that would be observed under a parliamentary and a presidential regime, respectively, will be undertaken. Moreover, we analyze to what extend constitutional choices are driven by anticipated policy outcomes under various legislative regimes. Theoretical prediction will be tested empirically, where not only comparative static results derived from our theory will be tested based on agricultural protection levels observed for different EU-systems, but also different model dynamics , i.e .speed of adaption of agricultural protection levels, predicted for different regimes by our theory.
Region: EU-member states and other developed and developing countries
Publications:
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning and Eva Krampe: How the European Union Works: Theory and Empirical Evidence from EU Agricultural Policy.
    Paper presented at the Political Economy of International Organizations (PEIO), Zurich, Switzerland Extern
Keywords: comparative political economy, agricultural protection, constitutional rules, time-series cross-national data
Approach: Using a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 60 democracies since 1961 we will assess the role of constitutional rules empirically.
Data acquisition: World Development Indicators, FAO, Database of Political Institutions

Electoral Systems and Agricultural Protection: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Parliamentary Democracies

Project: Political Institutions and Agricultural Protection: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Evidence from TSCS Data
Contact: Christian Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 09/2008
End: 09/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: Despite numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade liberalization, agriculture remains highly protected in many but not all industrialized countries. Thus, inspired by new comparative political economy studies of Persson and Tabellini and others, our main aim in this work package is to explain how agricultural protection levels are systematically tied to different modes of political representation in industrialized countries. In particular, the role of electoral rules and bargaining within legislature of industrialized parliamentary systems in determining the political success of agriculture in attracting government transfers based on a probabilistic voting environment. In particular, the interaction effect between formal constitutional rules and informal institutions, i.e. coalition discipline and the influence of interest groups, should be analyzed.
Region: developed countries
Publications:
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning: Determinants of Agricultural Protection from an International Perspective. The Role of Political Institutions.
    IFPRI Discussion Paper 00805, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2008 Download Extern
Keywords: comparative political economy, EU-system, Common agricultural policy, formal and informal political institutions
Approach: Using a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 23 parliamentary democracies since 1961 we will empirically investigate the impact of electoral rule on agricultural protection.
Data acquisition: World Development Indicators, FAO, Database of Political Institutions

Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Project: Political Institutions and Agricultural Protection: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical Evidence from TSCS Data
Contact: Christian H. C. A. Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 09/2008
End: 09/2012
Finance: DFG
Content: This work package studies the interplay of formal constitutional rules and informal political institutions in determining the political success of agriculture in avoiding taxation or attracting government transfers in developing and industrialized countries, respectively. The model is based on a probabilistic voting environment incorporating legislative bargaining. In particular, the impact of electorate systems and parliamentary versus presidential systems are analyzed as formal constitutional rules, while legislative norms and political influence of interest groups are analyzed as informal institutions.
Region: developing and developed countries
Publications:
  • Christian H. C. A. Henning: Determinants of Agricultural Protection from an International Perspective. The Role of Political Institutions.
    IFPRI Discussion Paper 00805, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2008 Extern
Keywords: comparative political economy, agricultural protection, constitutional rules, time-series cross-national data
Approach: Using a dynamic panel estimation based on time-series cross-country data for 75 countries since 1961 we will assess the role of constitutional rules empirically.
Data acquisition: World Development Indicators, FAO, Database of Political Institutions

Political Power of Donors via Ideas? Theoretical and Empirical Insights from a Network-based Belief Formation Model

Project: Promoting Participatory and Evidence-Based Agricultural Policy Processes in Africa
Contact: Christian Henning and Eva Krampe
Start: 04/2012
End: 03/2015
Finance: IFPRI/CAU
Content: Building on the discussion about the influence of donor organizations on policy choices in developing countries, we advance the understanding of the donor-recipient relation by developing a knowledge-based power index. Our power index explicitly considers the information exchange between donors and national governments in political communication networks, while classical approaches focus solely on the aid based power relationship. We assess the knowledge-based power of donors by incorporating the process of political belief formation within communication networks into a non-cooperative Baron-Ferejohn-type legislative decision-making model. Such a model allows to calculate the capacity of non-governmental organizations to determine policy positions of governmental actors and thereby final policy decisions though they do not possess formal legislative voting power. We also simulate policy decisions under real and assumed power distributions among agents. We apply the model empirically to analyze the political influence of relevant donor and stakeholder organizations regarding agricultural sector investment programs based on the principles of CAADP in Malawi and Ghana.
Region: Malawi, Ghana, Senegal, Uganda
Publications:
  • Eva Krampe and Christian H. C. A. Henning: Political Power of Donors via Ideas? Theoretical and Empirical Insights from a Network-based Belief Formation Model..
    Paper accepted for presentation at the 71st Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Chicago, USA
Keywords: Political belief formation, political influence , policy networks, agricultural policy reform, CAADP
Approach: Policy network analyses
Data acquisition: Policy network surveys held in Malawi in 2010, in Ghana in 2012, in Uganda in 2012 and in Senegal in 2013